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ARTICLE
WHOSE BRIGHT IDEA WAS THIS ANYWAY?
THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN MARYLAND
By: Yosef Kuperman1
This paper describes how Maryland switched from
the life-tenured appointed judiciary under its original
Constitution to an elected judiciary. It traces the
history of judicial selection from the appointments
after 1776 through the Ripper Bills of the early
nineteenth century to the eventual adoption of
judicial elections in 1850. It finds that the supporters
of judicial elections had numerous complex motives
that boiled down to trying to make the Judiciary less
political but more publically accountable. At the end
of the day, Marylanders trusted elections more than
politicians.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Nobody likes electing judges these days; it produces bad results. After
Baltimore County Circuit Court Judge Alexander Wright infamously lost his
seat in a contested primary election in 2000, for example, the Baltimore Sun
blamed “ballot position and dirty tricks.”2 The Sun understandably called for
reform.3 After Wright, reappointed to the bench within weeks of his defeat,
lost again in 2002, the Baltimore Sun cited various explanations — racism,
dirty politics, bad campaigning, and voter ignorance.4 Not one of these
possible explanations reflects well on judicial elections.
1

Yosef Kuperman is a Maryland attorney and a fan of history. Yosef would like to
thank the Honorable Frederic N. Smalkin (retired), whose advice considerably
improved this paper, and the many other people who proofread, edited, commented
on, and cite checked this. Yosef accepts sole credit only for the mistakes.
2
Editorial, An Ugly Process, BALT. SUN, Mar. 9, 2000, at 20A. The Baltimore Sun
ascribed Judge Wright’s defeat not to racism, but to the fact that “Wright” appears
last on alphabetical lists and to dirty tricks. (Judge Wright would have been the first
African American judge elected in Baltimore County.) Judge Robert Dugan, whom
the Sun had accused of playing the dirty tricks, wrote a letter to the editor denying
those allegations. The Honorable Robert Dugan, Letter to the Editor, BALTIMORE
SUN, Mar. 25, 2000, at 12A.
3
Editorial, supra note 2, at 20A.
4
Jonathan Rockoff & Stephanie Hanes, Judge’s Loss Spurs Questions of Racism,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 7, 2002, at 1B. Judge Wright himself declined to ascribe his defeat
to racism. Id. University of Baltimore School of Law Professor Byron Warnken,
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Calls for reform abound. Numerous writers have devoted countless
articles and books to fixing the system.5 To highlight a local example, Dana
Levitz and Ephraim Siff recently published an article explaining how
Maryland should change the election of circuit court judges.6 So far, voters
remain unpersuaded.7
Although reform remains a current topic, people rarely ask why Maryland
adopted judicial elections in the first place. Whose bright idea was this
anyway? On reflection, judicial elections do not make much sense. They
deliberately politicize a branch of government whose legitimacy depends
precisely on being apolitical. They are not just another historical left-over
like the Electoral College. Maryland originally used life-tenure and
executive appointments like the United States Constitution.8 In fact, judicial
elections are not even part of the wider common law tradition. “Almost no
one else in the world has ever experimented with the popular election of
judges.”9 However, Maryland seems set on keeping them.
Maryland originally adopted judicial elections as part of a larger judicial
reform aimed at making judges less political and at the same time more
answerable.
Marylanders simultaneously switched from life-tenured
appointed judges to elected, term-limited judges because Marylanders
wanted judges to answer to the people, not the politicians. This change did
not take place suddenly, or in a vacuum. Maryland had a long and troubled
history with life-tenure. Introduced after the revolution, it received little
respect. Maryland in fact fired its entire judiciary between 1801 and 1806
interviewed at the time, felt that “what really happens for the vast, vast majority of
voters is they have no idea who the candidates are.” Id. The controversy attracted
enough attention at the time to generate a series of letters to the editor. See Letters to
the Editor, BALT. SUN, Nov. 13, 2002, at 14A; Letters to the Editor, BALT. SUN,
Nov. 19, 2002, at 14A.
5
See, e.g., JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012).
6
Dana Levitz & Ephraim Siff, The Selection and Election of Circuit Judges in
Maryland: A Time for Change, 40 U. BALT. L.F. 39 (2009).
7
81.9% of state appellate judges and 87% of state trial judges must still stand for
election. ABA, Report No. 2 of the Task Force on Lawyer’s Political Contributions,
Part 2, Attachment B. (1998) But see Roy A. Schotland, Comment, Law &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 149, 154, which puts the numbers at 87% for
both.
8
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Constitution adopted life-tenure because the British
had adopted it to prevent the King from sacking judges who ruled against him. See
Shugerman, supra note 4, at 15-18. They thought it would protect judicial
Independence against a tyrant. Id.
9
Shugerman, supra note 5, at 5. This needs some qualifiers. Parliament, for
example, originally had a judicial component to it, as did some colonial assemblies.
Id. at 14-15. Some relics of this persist until modern times. Massachusetts’s
legislature remains the “General Court” even today, and Britain’s highest court of
appeals was technically a committee of the House of Lords until 2009.
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after the Jeffersonians drove the Federalists from office. Complaints about
hyper-partisan judges were still present in 1850, when Maryland adopted
judicial elections. Marylanders believed that judicial elections would cure
those problems by making the judges answerable directly to the people,
instead of the corrupt politicians.
II.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Early historians of judicial elections thought that judicial elections
emerged from the trend towards popular rule during the Age of Jackson.
Viscount James Bryce, for example, discussed judicial elections when trying
to explain American democracy to a British audience.10 Bryce ascribed
judicial elections to “a wave of democratic sentiment” that “swept over the
nation” during the Jacksonian period.11 To Bryce, judicial elections were a
terrible idea to which Americans stuck out of “obedience to a so-called
[democratic] principle.”12
Learned Hand similarly attributed judicial
elections to “a burst of democratic enthusiasm” and “the full tide of
Jacksonian democracy.”13 Some historians interpreted this movement as an
attempt to bring the judiciary to heel by making them responsible to the
people; others saw it as a partisan move by Jacksonian political outsiders

10

James Bryce, 1st Viscount Bryce OM, GCVO, PC, FRS, FBA was a British jurist,
historian, and politician. He served as British Ambassador to the United States from
1907 to 1913. Bryce based his observations on a Tocqueville-esque tour of the
United States.
11
JAMES BRYCE, 2 MODERN DEMOCRACIES 63 (1921). Bryce interestingly ascribed
the related American drive for direct legislation, in part, to a popular belief in “a sort
of mystical sanctity not susceptible of delegation [that] dwells in the Whole People,”
although he also credited anger at special interests and “a deep-rooted distrust of
State Legislatures.” Id. at 93.
12
Id. at 93.
13
Learned Hand, The Elective and Appointive Methods of Selection of Judges, in 3
PROC. ACA. POL. SCI. N. Y. 130, 130-31. (Henry Musey, ed., 1913).
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aimed at seizing judicial power.14 Both of these explanations — as later
historians demonstrate — are simply wrong.15
Modern historians challenged this interpretation beginning with Kermit
Hall in 1983. Hall argued that judicial elections were a lawyerly attempt to
enhance judicial power and prestige by tying judicial office to the ultimate
source of legitimacy — the ballot box.16 According to Hall, politically
moderate lawyers dominated the constitutional conventions that adopted
judicial elections.17 They thought that judicial elections would lead to faster,
more prestigious, more independent, and less political courts.18 Elections
would allow judges “a regular opportunity to have their power confirmed in
the same way as governors and legislators.”19 Elections would give judges
the political legitimacy to curb the legislature and create “judicial
legislation.”20
Ten years later, Caleb Nelson rejected Kermit Hall’s theory.21 If judicial
elections were merely a lawyerly plot, they would not have received
enthusiastic popular support.22 Although many lawyers at the conventions
supported judicial elections, that support simply reflected the enormous

14

See generally Kermit Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform
and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860, 45 HISTORIAN 337, 338-39 (1983)
(summarizing existing literature on the subject). Interestingly, much previous
scholarship obsesses about New York’s seminal role in starting the ball rolling in
1846. See, e.g., Russell Niles, The Popular Election of Judges in Historical
Perspective, 21 Rec. Ass’n B. City N. Y. 523, 523 (1966) (claiming that if not for
New York’s experience, “we might not now have elected judges . . . in the United
States.”) Hall discards this theory as erroneous based on studying the debates from
the constitutional conventions that allegedly followed New York’s lead. Hall, supra
note 14, at 340, n. 14. This author's own perusal of Maryland’s debates convinces
him that Hall is correct.
15
See Caleb Nelson, A Reevaluation of the Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the
Elective Judiciary in Ante-Bellum America, 37 Am. J. Legal Hist. 190, 193-99
(1993) (rebutting the “partisan” explanation of the origins of judicial elections with
cold hard facts.) See also Hall, supra note 14, (rebutting the “judicial leash” theory
with cold hard facts.)
16
Hall, supra note 14, at 354.
17
Id. at 342-43. The only exception was Massachusetts.
18
Id. at 343; see Kermit Hall, The “Route to Hell” Retraced: The Impact of Popular
Election on the Southern Judiciary, 1832-1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 229, 230 (David Bodenhamer & James Ely, eds., 1984).
19
Hall, supra note 14, at 350.
20
Id. at 350-51.
21
Nelson, supra note 15, at 203. Strangely, Nelson seems to misread Hall’s work.
He claims that Hall “is wrong to suggest that [moderate reformers] identified
legislatures with popular majorities.” Id. Hall simply does not say that. In that
light, Nelson’s theory does not refute Hall’s theory, but rather expands on it.
22
Id.

92

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 46.2

popularity of judicial elections.23 In fact, even after lawyers soured on the
idea during the Progressive Era, judicial elections remained (and remain)
popular.24
Rather, Nelson suggested that judicial elections “arose from the people’s
profound distrust of their own government.”25 The conventions that
instituted judicial elections wanted the elected judiciary to restrain not only
majorities, but also the entire government.26 Judges had to protect the people
against their corrupt legislatures and governors.27 To protect the people from
the government, the judges had to be independent of the government.
Practically, that meant direct elections. But the conventions did not trust the
judges any more than the legislatures. Judicial elections were “part of a
coherent program to rein in not just the legislatures, but all the people’s
agents.”28
In February, 2012, Jed Shugerman expanded on Nelson’s theory. Writing
about the history of judicial independence, Shugerman observed that judicial
elections arose from widely held beliefs in judicial independence and the
separation of powers.29 Advocates of judicial elections always claimed that
the elections would promote “judicial independence and constitutional
protections.”30 They hoped that an elected judiciary would provide a “less
partisan and less politicized bench” that could check the other branches of
government.31
Shugerman placed judicial elections firmly in their historical context.
Judicial elections appeared in response not only to “ideas about judicial
independence, parties, and democratic politics” but also to “interest groups
and economics.”32 The conventions that adopted judicial elections during the
antebellum period did so as part of a larger response to economic panics in
the 1830s and 40s.33 Those conventions blamed their economic woes on
“legislative overspending on internal improvements.”34 They therefore
attempted to limit legislative power by various means, including by creating
a stronger and more independent judiciary.35
None of these theories properly describes what happened in the Maryland
Convention or address Maryland’s unique history leading up to change.
23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Nelson, supra note 15, at 205.
27
Id. at 206.
28
Id. at 207.
29
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 6-9.
30
Id. at 6.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 8.
33
Id. at 10.
34
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 10.
35
Id.
24
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Judicial elections, at least according to the men who advocated for them on
the convention floor, did not aim to keep the legislature from squandering
money. Rather, the elections were intended to reduce political corruption and
secure a more honest judiciary by taking the power to appoint judges away
from venial public servants.
III.

COLONIAL – 1801

Early Maryland efforts to improve the judiciary never contemplated
judicial elections. Before 1776, Maryland had no judicial elections and
preserved its judiciary largely unchanged through the American Revolution.
When Maryland finally implemented major judicial reforms in the 1790s and
early 1800s, it did not implement elections. Instead, the reforms attempted to
improve the judiciary by implementing a professional, life-tenured system
based on gubernatorial appointments.
Maryland’s Judiciary during the colonial period resembled England’s
during the same period. Justices of the peace and county courts heard small
matters locally.36 More important matters and appeals from the county courts
came before the “Provincial Court” in Annapolis, the equivalent of England’s
King’s Bench.37 Disappointed litigants in the Provincial Court could appeal
to a “Court of Appeals,” which consisted of the Governor and Council, but
few did.38 From there, truly aggrieved litigants could appeal to the King’s
Privy Council in England, but even fewer bothered.39 Lacking professional
judges, Maryland staffed the courts with justices of the peace.40 Every judge
36

CARROLL BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY 4 (1928),
available at http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001
/000368/html/am368p--1.html. Carroll Bond served as Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals from 1924 until 1943, and chaired the “Bond Commission” for reforming
the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 53. The “Court of Appeals” was actually a side-job of the governor and his
council, and not an important side job at that. Id. In May Term, 1776, for example,
Bond reports that the Court had all of seven appeals docketed for the term. Id.
39
Id. at 42-43. Due to travel costs, appeals to the British privy council were
apparently impractical for most litigants. The privy council still exists and still hears
appeals from (among other things) some Commonwealth countries, the Court of
Admiralty of the Cinque Ports, and the Disciplinary Committee of the Royal College
of Veterinary Surgeons. Role of the JCPC, JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PRIVY
COUNCIL, http://www.jcpc.gov.uk/about/role-of-the-jcpc.html, (last visited Jan. 24,
2013).
40
BOND, supra note 36, at 8-11. Bond points out that although the judges were
laymen, laymen in the colonial period knew far more law than layman today. These
layman also used young lawyers as clerks and could refer difficult questions to the
Maryland Bar. Id. at 11-15. Also, some lawyers found their way onto Governor’s
council, so the court system was not entirely bereft of trained legal minds. Id. at 4445.
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and justice of the peace served at the pleasure of the governor, although by
the middle of the eighteenth century, judges customarily sat until voluntary
retirement.41
Maryland adopted a more modern-looking court system in its postRevolutionary Declaration of Rights and Constitution.42 The governor and
council lost their judicial functions.43 Instead, the Constitution established a
new Court of Appeals, “composed of persons of integrity and sound
judgment in the law,” to supervise the entire judicial system.44 The
Provincial Court, its membership set at three lawyers, became the “General
Court.”45 The county courts, however, continued to be lawyer-free.46 For the
most part, the personnel, except in the Court of Appeals, remained the
same.47 The judges at every level held their position with life-tenure after
gubernatorial appointment.48
Maryland’s new Court of Appeals had trouble getting off the ground for
want of qualified personnel. At the first session of the General Assembly in
February, 1777, the House of Delegates sent the Senate a list of nominees for
every office in the new Constitution.49 But the Delegates had trouble finding
anyone suitable for the Court of Appeals.50 Due to the low workload and low
salary, the seats on the court were not a full time job, but the judges could not
take other legal work.51 The Delegates finally nominated and the Senate
finally appointed the five judges to the Court of Appeals in January, 1779.52

41

Id. at 55. The American colonies used appointed judges and justices of the peace
everywhere except Rhode Island and Connecticut. RICHARD ELLIS, THE
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 6 (1971).
42
See, e.g., MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. VI (embracing
separation of powers in principal).
43
Id. at art. LVI.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at art. XL, XLVIII.
47
BOND, supra note 36, at 62.
48
MD CONST. OF 1776, art. XL, XLVIII.
49
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE OF
MARYLAND, H.D. FEB. 1777 1st. Sess., at, 58-60 (1777).
50
Id. at 60; BOND, supra note 36, at 61-62.
51
BOND, supra note 36, at 64-65.
52
VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE OF
MARYLAND, H. D. OCT. 1778, 1st. Sess. at 64-65 (1778). BOND, supra note 36, at 63.
The General Assembly chose to name five judges because five judges had formed a
quorum when the colonial Court of Appeals met without the governor or the
president of the council. Id. at 62. The House of Delegates had originally wanted to
name three judges and have the remaining two seats filled by the chief judges of the
three lower courts (i.e. the Chancellor, the Judge of the Admiralty Court, and the
Chief Judge of the General Court) —the chief judge of the originating court would
recuse himself. Id. at 61. Although this may have mitigated the personnel problems
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Even then, the court did not hear cases until after the Revolution because the
judges were busy with the war effort.53 The Court of Appeals received its
first transcripts in October, 1780 and heard its first case in May, 1783.54
Staffing problems proved endemic. Although one judge left the bench in
1783 and another died in 1792, Maryland did not replace them until the
Jeffersonians took power in 1801.55 Apparently nobody wanted the job.56
The lower courts, meanwhile, were slowly decentralizing to improve
efficiency. In 1785, Maryland enlarged the jurisdiction of the county courts.
To get into the General Court, a case needed to be worth at least “one
hundred pounds of current money.”57 Nevertheless, the system remained
“attended with great inconvenience, delay and expense, to suits, witnesses
and jurymen” and a lack of “uniformity of legal decisions.”58 In 1790,
Maryland (imitating the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789) implemented a new
system of five judicial districts to cover the state.59 Each district consisted of
one chief justice, with legal training, and two associate justices, without legal
training, in each county.60 These new judges, unlike the justices of the peace
whom they replaced, held life-tenure.61
This system developed its own problems. Declaring that “uniformity of
legal decisions ought to be obtained as far as the circumstances will permit,”
Maryland passed another judicial reform in 1796.62 The law expanded the
powers of the new justices. They could now handle bail, acknowledge
deeds, and compel discovery of documents in actions at law using chancery
court procedures.63 Maryland also banned various practices. Justices on the
new district courts could no longer “act as an attorney or solicitor in any
court of law or equity” while in office.64 Plaintiffs in suits to collect debts
could no longer arrest defendants outside of the county in which the suit took

on the Court, the Senate rejected the plan because it would entangle the appellate
judiciary and the trial courts. Id.
53
BOND, supra note 36, at 72-74.
54
Id. at 69-70, 74.
55
Id. at 78.
56
Id.
57
1785 Md. Laws 142.
58
1790 Md. Laws 496.
59
1790 Md. Laws 497 (each district contained multiple counties).
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
1795 Md. Laws 221.
63
Id. at 222. At common law, actions had no discovery. In Equity, however, actions
did. This bill allowed (among other things) county judges to issue bills of discovery
to compel the disclosure of books or writings in the possession of the litigant.
64
Id.
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place.65 Lawsuits could not continue beyond “the end of the first court after
the imparlance court” without mutual consent or the discretion of the court.66
The reforms did not prove a panacea. One observer in 1802 felt that
creation of judicial districts had allowed “all the mischiefs and
inconveniences that could possibly result from a combination of ignorance,
prejudice, and partiality.”67 The associate justices “labour[ed] under an
invincible ignorance” and sat “mute as alabaster busts” while the chief
justice dictated the law “as the Pope among the Cardinals … infallible.”68
IV.

1800-1805: THE JEFFERSONIAN REVOLUTION

Maryland’s judiciary reforms grew extremely political once power
changed hands. When the Jeffersonians won control of the Maryland House
of Delegates in 1800, they reformed the judiciary. Again, they made no
mention of judicial elections. The initial judicial reforms were not real
reforms at all. The Jeffersonians implemented them to steal patronage
positions from defeated Federalists despite the life-tenure provisions. They
used a series of “ripper acts” to fire the Federalist judges despite life-tenure
and succeeded in completely replacing the entire judiciary within half a
decade.69
65

Id.
Id. at 223. The “imparlance” court is the court that takes the pleadings in a case.
The wording of 1795 Md. Laws 221 Section 11 is simply confusing. “Unless by the
consent of parties, at the discretion of the court,” or good legal cause.
67
JOHN LEEDS BOZMAN, A NEW ARRANGEMENT OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE OF THE
STATE OF MARYLAND PROPOSED 28 (1802). Many sources, including a biography
of Bozman from 1888 and library catalogs, ascribe this work to John Leeds Bozman.
See SAMUEL HARRISON, A MEMOIR OF JOHN LEEDS BOZMAN: THE FIRST HISTORIAN
OF MARYLAND 38 (1888). Harrison claimed he had “excellent authority,” but after
the custom of the nineteenth century, declined to provide it. Id. Ellis also attributes
the pamphlet to Bozman, although without noting that it does not bear the author’s
name. ELLIS, supra note 41, at 333, n. 32. Ellis, incidentally, relies on the pamphlet
to show that the reforms in 1806 intended to “keep the courts under the control of the
legal profession.” Id. This writer can find no evidence that anyone took this
pamphlet seriously at all. Its proposed reforms did not become law. To claim it
shows early evidence of a lawyerly plot to retain control of the judiciary seems a
rather large stretch. At most, it shows that Bozman (and by extension others) wanted
more lawyers on the bench.
68
BOZMAN, supra note 67, at 33-34.
69
A “ripper bill” or “ripper act” means, in modern parlance, “a statute that gives a
government’s chief executive broad powers to appoint and remove department heads
or other subordinate officials.” Ripper Act, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (9th ed.
2009). That is close to the sense used here, although the bill left the governor no
discretion on unseating judges. Shugerman uses the term to refer to a law that strips
appointed judges of their life-tenure offices, and this author follows his usage here.
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 37.
66
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By way of background, the defeated Federalists had not been bi-partisan
in their judicial appointments. They had filled the court positions created in
1790 with party loyalists, breeding resentment among the minority
Jeffersonians. In fact, those appointees apparently abused their power to
appoint election judges.70 That said, the Federalists (perhaps accidentally)
left the Jeffersonians two open seats on the Court of Appeals.71
Things came to a head in 1800 when the Jeffersonians finally defeated the
Federalists and took control of the Maryland legislature by a margin of 4037, with three independents.72 Over the next five years, the Jeffersonians
widened their lead as Federalist efforts dwindled to “little more than a rear
guard action to stop their enemy’s growth.”73 In 1801, for example, the
Jeffersonians won by an even larger majority. They took forty-five seats to
the Federalist’s twenty-eight, with five delegates in the center.74
The Jeffersonians promptly implemented a judicial ripper act.75 The law
abolished the existing courts by repealing the 1796 statute that created

Ripper bills constitutionally functioned by abolishing the old court and creating an
identical new one.
70
NORMAN RISJORD, CHESAPEAKE POLITICS, 1781-1800, at 477 (1978). At any rate,
the Jeffersonians saw the need to remove that function immediately.
71
BOND, supra note 36, at 78. Bond, studiously ignoring the politics involved,
ascribed the failure to fill the seat to a lack of qualified candidates. Shugerman,
however, feels the Federalists “botched their appointments to the Court of Appeals.”
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 44. This seems unlikely. The 1800 election produced
a divided government that elected a Federalist governor. MARX RENZULLI,
MARYLAND: THE FEDERALIST YEARS 217 (1973). Even if the Federalists had
somehow forgotten to fill the positions while anticipating defeat in the 1800 election,
they had an additional year before they lost the governorship. The Jeffersonians
cemented their position on the Court of Appeals by mandating that vacancies would
remain unfilled until the Court shrunk to three judges. 1801 Md. Laws 73.
Shugerman believes that this kicked two judges off the bench. SHUGERMAN, supra
note 5, at 44. He follows Risjord’s interpretation of the statute, although Risjord
believes there were only four justices on the bench at the time, so only one lost their
seat. RISJORD, supra note 70, at 477. That reading of the 1801 Bill contradicts the
explicit text of the Statute. It also contradicts Maryland’s official list. Historical
List: Maryland Court of Appeals Judges, 1778-, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND,
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/ctappj.html (last visited
Dec. 27, 2012).
72
RENZULLI, supra note 71, at 215. Although the independents mostly voted
Republican, they voted Federalist often enough to elect a Federalist governor and
U.S. Senator. Id.
73
Id. at 227-28.
74
RISJORD, supra note 70, at 565.
75
RENZULLI, supra note 71 at 215, 227; SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 37.
For a blow by blow account of the procedural maneuvers to pass the bill, including a
Suspension of the Rules and an analysis of voting patterns showing hyperpartisanship, see RISJORD, supra note 70, at 477-78.
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them.76 The same ripper act also created “new” courts by incorporating the
text of that same 1796 statute.77 The law made some changes. The levy
courts, composed of Justices of the Peace appointed to one-year terms, would
name the election judges, not the life-tenure county judges.78 Practically,
however, this law fired every judge in the district courts notwithstanding
their life-tenure. The Jeffersonians then filled the seats with their own
appointments.
The Federalist incumbents sued.79 The General Court, equally vulnerable
to a ripper bill, declined to intervene.80 Instead, it pulled a reverse Marbury
v. Madison; the court held that it could have stricken the bill down, had it
been unconstitutional.81 This holding did nothing for the ousted judges.
The Jeffersonians did not stop there. They promptly passed another
reform bill aimed at the General Court and the Court of Appeals in 1802.82
(As a Constitutional Amendment, the bill needed to pass twice in consecutive
sessions before taking effect.83) This bill abolished the General Court and
created a two-tiered judiciary. Two lawyer District Justices in each of five
districts would sit in each county court within their district alongside a non76

1801 Md. Laws 66.
The 1801 Law is substantially identical to the old law. For example, the 1790
Law established that the governor and council would appoint the justices of the
County Courts. 1790 Md. Laws 497. The 1796 Law repealed all of the 1790 Law
except Section 4, which it adopted directly. 1796 Md. Laws 221. The 1801 Law
contains the same language as the 1796 law until it reaches the incorporation. Even
though it later explicitly repeals the 1790 Law, 1801 Md. Laws 76, it replaces the
incorporation of the 1790 Law with the exact language of the 1790 Act. Although
the laws were not identical, most differences are hard to spot. Those differences
relate to particular details of application not relevant to the present discussion. For
example, Section Four of the 1801 Act is Section Five of the 1796 Act, except for a
small three line clause at the end preventing the clause from effecting the powers of
“the court of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery for Baltimore County or giving the
county court of Baltimore criminal jurisdiction.” 1801 Md. Laws 67. While this
may have made all the differences to some people back then, they are largely
irrelevant to the question at hand.
78
1801 Md. Laws 70.
79
Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236 (Md. 1802). Whittington enjoyed the spotlight
in its day because it did not happen in a vacuum. The decision largely foreshadowed
Marbury v. Madison by a few months. The author of the opinion, Jeremiah Townley
Chase, was the cousin and close friend of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase, and
political observers closely watched Whittington to see the reaction of a Federalist
Judiciary. SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 38.
80
See Whittington v. Polk, 1 H. & J. 236.
81
Id. Like the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, the Whittington Court spent
several pages extolling judicial review in dicta before not stopping the law. Id. at
242-245.
82
1802 Md. Laws 63.
83
MD CONST. OF 1776, art. LIX.
77
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lawyer Associate Justice from the county.84 The bill also fired the sitting
Court of Appeals judges just as the previous bill had fired the old district
judges.85
Then politics reshuffled. The confirmation bill failed in 1803 because
moderate Republicans and Federalists united against it.86 The next year, the
new centrist coalition passed its own reform bill.87 This new law
implemented massive court reform. It divided the state into six judicial
districts.88 Three lawyerly district judges would sit on each county court in a
district.89 The abolished General Court was folded into a new Court of
Appeals, composed of the Chief Judges of the new Districts.90 Like the
previous legislation, however, this act also fired every judge in the state.
Unlike the fate of its predecessor, the bill’s backers held together and enacted
it. The confirmation bill passed the following year.91
Although the bill “ripped” the Court of Appeals and General Court, it did
not produce a complete personnel change, or even a partisan one.92 The new
coalition rehired two out of the three judges of the General Court as Chief
Judges and retained many of the judges of the district courts.93 Many of the
84

1802 Md. Laws 64.
Id.
86
Ellis claims that moderate Republicans and Federalists allied against the Bill
because it “endanger the independence of the judiciary and would allow the courts to
come under the control of people untrained in the law.” ELLIS, supra note 41, at 244.
This seems unlikely. First, the bill would have given lawyers a majority on the
bench to outvote non-lawyers for the first time, so it could hardly put laymen in
charge of the courts. If anything, it did the opposite. Second, it seems rather late in
the day for lawmakers to develop scruples about judicial independence. Rather, it
seems more likely based on the final version of the bill eventually passed by this
coalition, 1804 Md. Laws 45, that it did not do enough to professionalize the courts.
Based on their appointments, it seems that the new coalition adopted bipartisanship.
87
ELLIS, supra note 41, at 244.
88
1804 Md. Laws 45.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 8. Strangely, Shugerman believes that Whittington v. Polk gave the General
Court sufficient political cover to withstand the movement to abolish it.
SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 33. He is simply mistaken.
92
BOND, supra note 36, at 97-98.
93
BOND, supra note 36, at 99-104. Bond lists two judges of the General Court and
two of the District Courts whom the Governor offered Chief Judgeships. Judge
Jeremiah Chase, both a Federalist and Samuel Chase’s cousin and friend, wound up
Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. Id.; SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 38. The
third General Court Judge, John Done, wound up as an Associate Judge in the Fourth
District and was eventually promoted to Chief Judge in 1814. John Done (ca. 17471831), ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc3500/
sc3520/000300/000353/html/msa00353.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2012).
Interestingly, Judge James Tilghman, whom John Leeds Bozman positively hated,
kept his seat as Chief Judge of the Second District. BOND, supra note 36, at 99-104.
85
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new judges, including the new Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals, were
Federalists.94 But the new leadership declined to rehire any of the Justices of
the Court of Appeals as Chief Judges of the district courts.95 The leadership
offered two incumbent judges —both seventy-one years old— seats as
associate judges, and only one accepted.96 The others lost their jobs, lifetenure notwithstanding.
V.

1806-1850: LEAD UP TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION

Reform in Maryland moved slowly, although similar concerns appeared
elsewhere. Beginning in 1833, for example, states began switching to
judicial elections to disempower their respective legislatures.97 The calls for
reform first gathered strength because Democrats —victims of a historic
gerrymander— did not let a crisis go to waste. While the major focus of the
crisis was economic and political, judicial reform was also present. 98 It
merely did not take the front seat.
Maryland’s road toward judicial elections began in early 1836.
Supporters of internal improvements promised “certain and immediate”
returns to persuade Maryland to fund their projects with “millions upon
millions of public debts.”99 Not surprisingly, this proved too good to be true
and Maryland quickly went bankrupt.100 Marylanders promptly sought major
political reform.101
This call for reform exposed already existing complaints about
apportionment of the Legislature. In an effort to balance sectional interests,
Maryland had watered down Baltimore’s votes. This caused gross malBozman caricatured Tilghman in his pamphlet arguing for reform, spending three
pages on a prolonged (although anonymous) character assassination against a Chief
Judge of a District in Maryland. BOZMAN, supra note 67, at 31-33. Harrison
insists that what Bozman presents as caricature is in fact portrait. HARRISON, supra
note 67, at 39-40. The Governor of Maryland and his council apparently disagreed
with Bozman’s assessment.
94
BOND, supra note 36, at 99-104.
95
Id. at 97; Historical List: Maryland Court of Appeals Judges, 1778-, ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/ctappj.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
96
BOND, supra note 36, at 97-98; see also Historical List: Maryland Court of
Appeals Judges, supra note 95.
97
See SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 10.
98
See JAMES WARNER HARRY, THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTION OF 1851 18-19, 47
(1902).
99
Id.
100
See id.; SHUGERMAN, supra note 5, at 85 (Maryland was not alone; nine States
folded as a result of the ensuing Panics. The recession lasted until 1843.).
101
See HARRY, supra note 98, at 17.
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apportionment.102 Maryland watered down Baltimore’s votes. Baltimore, a
city of 80,000, both had two senators and two delegates as Annapolis,
“normally a quiet town of several thousand.” 103 Maryland’s sparsely
populated counties, by way of comparison, received four delegates each
regardless of population.104
In the 1836 elections, the Whigs won a 21-19 majority in the Maryland
Senate’s Electoral College despite losing the election by about three
thousand popular votes.105 A political crisis erupted when the Democrats
refused to attend the convention to elect the Senate, denying it a quorum.106
Without a Senate, Maryland’s government could not function. Although the
Democrats eventually caved, the Whig-dominated General Assembly decided
to pass a Reform Bill.107 Although activists wanted a wide variety of judicial
reforms, including the abolition of gubernatorial appointments and lifetenure, the resulting Reform Bill in 1837 did not change the judiciary.108
Demands for judicial reform resurfaced in 1844. As a result, the General
Assembly created an investigatory committee focused on judicial reform..109
People wanted broad reform because of “the necessity of all practical
economy in the expenditures of government” and “the embarrassed condition
of the finances of our State.”110 In simpler terms, Maryland was broke. The
Committee, however, feared that reforming the judiciary “solely with a view
to its cheapness” would be “false and suicidal economy.”111 The Committee
instead recommended other reforms, including firing the life-tenured
Chancellor and one life-tenured associate judge in each district.112 But the
reforms to come in 1850 were already under discussion. The Committee
already felt it needed to advocate retaining life-tenure.113 The Committee
reported reform bills towards the end of the session in early March, but they
failed to pass.114
102

See ROBERT BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 228 (1988).
For the relative sizes of Baltimore and Annapolis, see id. at 228.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 229. Maryland chose its Senate via an electoral college, similar to the
method by which America elects the President of the United States.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
HARRY, supra note 98, at 18-19, 47. 1836 Md. Laws 190.
109
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GRIEVANCES AND COURTS OF JUSTICE TO WHOM
WERE REFERRED THREE ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES RELATIVE TO THE
JUDICIARY 2 (1844). Proposals included switching to six judicial circuits, each
paying $2000, shrinking the Court of Appeals to three seats, and a special court
system for Baltimore.
110
Id. at 3.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 8.
113
Id. at 9.
114
Id. at 1. The Committee delivered its reports on March 5th. No mention appears
in the Session Laws of the year.
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Political agitation for reform continued. After a Stamp Tax popularly
known as the “British Stamp Act” went into effect in 1845, Maryland public
opinion wanted a convention to rein in the Legislature.115 After an 1845 bill
calling for a convention failed by a tie vote, the legislature took up the issue
again in the next session in 1847.116 It did not call for a political convention
because doing so while the state was “involved in financial embarrassment of
the most serious character” would hurt Maryland’s credit. 117 But the calls
continued. The Democratic candidate, running on a reform platform, carried
the next gubernatorial election by all of 709 votes.118 The overwhelming
agitation in 1850 led the Governor to warn the General Assembly that if it
did not call a convention, “the sanction of the [L]egislature would not much
longer be invoked.”119 So the General Assembly called a referendum on a
Convention, which the pro-Convention faction won.
VI.

THE CONVENTION OF 1850

Scholars give various reasons for the 1850 convention. Bond ascribes the
convention to reapportionment.120
Brugger ascribes it to the same
Baltimorean discontent regarding apportionment and high taxes used to pay
off the State debt.121 Evitts ascribes it to the same, as well as to the
“universal appeal” of judicial reform.122 Harry lists four causes: the malapportionment of the Legislature, anger at legislative constitutional
amendments, dislike of life-tenure in the judiciary, and the “lack of
constitutional check upon the legislature in the expenditures of the public
money.”123
The Convention dedicated an enormous amount of time to debating
judicial reforms. The debates spanned approximately 350 pages of the
Convention’s written record.124 But surprisingly, judicial election was only a
115

HARRY, supra note 98, at 22.
Id. at 22-23.
117
Id. at 23-24.
118
Id. at 24.
119
HARRY, supra note 98, at 29.
120
BOND, supra note 36, at 146.
121
BRUGGER, supra note 103, at 258. The State spent a fortune paying for its debts,
and had indeed suspended payment on bonds between 1841 and 1848. Id. at 232.
122
WILLIAM EVITTS, A MATTER OF ALLEGIANCES: MARYLAND FROM 1850 TO 1861,
at 34 (1974).
123
HARRY, supra note 98, at 25.
124
The debates on the judiciary committee of the convention begin midway through
the second volume. 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM
CONVENTION TO REVISE THE STATE CONSTITUTION 460 (1851) [hereinafter
DEBATES]. They end on page 803 of the same volume. Id. at 803. Although the
Convention discussed other matters during the intervening 343 pages, they spent the
vast majority of their time fighting about the judiciary.
116
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small part of a larger battle over the judiciary. It was not even the most
important part. Bowie, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, deemed it a
dismal failure to consider bringing about “a mere change in the mode of
appointment” as the only reform.125 Chambers, Bowie’s main opponent,
thought that the main issue was life-tenure.126
Supporters of judicial elections controlled the Convention’s committee on
the subject.127 They endorsed a wide range of reforms. Their agenda
prominently featured term limits and judicial elections.128 Their reforms
would also “rip” the existing judges out of their seats.129
The dissenters shared a different vision. They did not rip the existing
judiciary.130 In fact, Chambers, one of the leading opponents of judicial
reform at the Convention, served as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals.131
The dissenters’ report retained both life-tenure and gubernatorial
appointments.132 But that report did not speak for all opinions. One
delegate, for example, wanted to pick judges by “joint ballot of the two
Houses of the General Assembly.”133
Supporters of almost every conceivable position claimed popular support.
According to Bowie, judicial elections alone had led Southern Maryland and
the Eastern Shore to support the Convention despite the risk of
reapportionment.134 But Bowie later admitted that he “never attended a
political meeting in [his] own county,” and had in fact been nominated in
absentia. He had no first-hand knowledge of what the people wanted.135
125

Id. For Mr. Bowie’s role as chairman of the judiciary committee, see 1 DEBATES,
supra note 126, at 239.
126
When Judge Chambers published his speech, he titled it the “Speech on the
Judicial Tenure,” indicating what he thought the major issue was. EZEKIEL
CHAMBERS, SPEECH ON THE JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE MARYLAND CONVENTION,
APRIL 1851 (1851).
127
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 460. There were only three or four dissenters.
128
1 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 239-43.
129
Id. at 239-43.
130
Id. at 516-19. To be clear, they explicitly continued the previous judiciary in
office. They did not merely want to re-hire all sitting justices.
131
For Judge Chambers’ biography, see Ezekiel Forman Chambers, ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5400/sc5496/034600/
034613/html/034613bio.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). Chambers, termed
“Chambers of Kent” to distinguish him from the other Mr. Chambers, spoke
repeatedly on the Judiciary.
132
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 516-17.
133
Id. at 460.
134
Id. at 460-61. Maryland’s constitution had an incredible apportionment
gerrymander that guaranteed Southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore
disproportionate population relative to Baltimore.
135
Id. at 501. Although nobody actually sent the convention a petition about the
topic, Mr. Bowie claimed that only one petition had been received, which was “in
reference to the sale of ardent spirits.” Id. at 461. Mr. Bowie –as pointed out there
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Tuck, a delegate from the same county, had not canvassed the county either,
but firmly believed that the people favored life-tenure.136 Chambers,
advocating for gubernatorial appointment and life-tenure, claimed his district
supported his position.137 Spencer, advocating for gubernatorial appointment
and term limits, claimed that his public support was “immutable and as fixed
as the mountains” and had been so “for the last twenty years.”138 Merrick
claimed that everyone in Carroll County supported judicial elections, but
Phelps, his colleague from the same district, claimed he had won after
running against judicial elections.139 Others simply admitted that their voters
were largely ignorant. Hicks’s constituents in Dorchester County primarily
wanted their taxes cut.140 One had “thought [Dorchester County was]
exclusively ill-treated because the Convention was not there.”141 This
constituent had “cursed the man; he had never seen him, and if Mr.
Convention would not show himself among the people, he would not vote for
him.”142
Supporters of judicial elections rested their beliefs on Jacksonian political
theory. They believed that since “all power emanates from the people,” the
people are sovereign.143 Appointing judges is a “necessary incident to
sovereignty itself.”144 To these supporters, this was no innovation; their
principles were those of 1776.145 The people had simply delegated the power
to appoint judges to their elected representatives, the politicians.146
Reformers believed that those politicians had turned judicial appointments
into “a mere political machine in the hands of the Governor and his

and as reading the debates easily shows— was simply mistaken. The Convention
received numerous sundry petitions. This author has no idea what Mr. Bowie meant.
136
Id. at 520.
137
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 467.
138
Id. at 491.
139
Id. at 501.
Mr. Merrick had served in the United States Senate from 1837 to 1845. Historical
List of United States Senators, ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/
msa/speccol/sc2600/sc2685/html/fedsenmems.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013.)
140
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 502.
Mr. Hicks went on to become governor of Maryland from 1858 to 1862. He kept
Maryland in the Union. See Thomas Holiday Hicks (1798-1865), ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND, http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc3500/sc3520/001400/
001462/html/1462extbio.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
141
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 502.
142
Id. at 502. Mr. Hicks apparently did not disabuse the man of this notion, for he
relates the person indeed refused to vote for Mr. Convention. And indeed, Mr.
Convention lost in Dorchester, 251-399. HARRY, supra note 98, at 85.
143
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 462.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 563.
146
Id. at 463.
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friends. . . by which the interests of … the State have been sacrificed.”147
Past governors had neither looked for “legal attainments and uprightness”
nor for “integrity of character … honesty” and “capability.”148 Rather, they
had selected “mere partisan adherents to certain political creeds … old and
infirm men, not fit, either mentally or physically” for the bench.149 In fact,
Bowie could not recall a single instance since 1776 where the politicians
“have not made the appointment depend more or less on the political
complexion of the applicant.”150 Spencer even charged that some judges had
“been nominated by political conventions.”151
Indeed, Bowie felt that the people could “do quite as well as [the
Legislature]” at appointing judges.152 If the people might make bad choices
or follow partisan considerations, politicians “have done the same thing,
have always done so, and will. . . always do so.”153 That said, Bowie did not
think the people would actually select bad judges. He thought that they
would “generally vote for the most trustworthy” candidate.154 Or at least
they might.155 The Governor and Senate, meanwhile, “never have and never
will, from now until the day of judgment.”156 Not all supporters thought it
would end happily though. Merrick felt that if the people elected bad judges,
“they will and they should suffer by it.”157
Supporters of judicial elections directly addressed concerns about judicial
independence.158 Bowie agreed that judges should be independent of
147

Id. Fascinatingly, Chambers denied that any appointments to the bench had been
partisan. Id. at 467-68. The debates are unclear if anyone believed him, but nobody
acted like he denied the obvious.
148
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 463.
149
Id.
150
Id. In Pennsylvania, Samuel Smucker made the charge more bluntly. He claimed
that in Pennsylvania, judgeships went to “the relations —the brothers, the cousins,
the sons-in-law” of the sitting governor. SAMUEL SMUCKER, ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR
OF A POPULAR JUDICIARY 4 (1850). If no relatives could take the seat, the
appointments then devolved to the Governor’s political cronies. Id.
151
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 490. Maryland did not complain alone. One
delegate in Pennsylvania’s comparable convention alleged that appointments as
Justices of the Peace had become “a sort of small coin, to pay small partisans in the
war of elections.” JOSEPH HOPKINSON, SPEECHES OF JOSEPH HOPKINSON AND
CHARLES CHAUNCEY ON THE JUDICIAL TENURE DELIVERED IN THE CONVENTION OF
PENNSYLVANIA FOR REVISING THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1838). Apparently,
Pennsylvanian governors had begun to issue “hundreds of them” in the last weeks of
their lame duck terms. Id.
152
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 463.
153
Id. at 464.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 501.
158
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 464.
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“improper bias —independent of all impressions. . . made upon their minds
by wicked, artful and treacherous practices.”159 But he believed that judges
should never become “independent of the people.”160 In fact, public opinion
possessed a “wholesome restraint and moral sense” worthy of obedience.161
That said, Bowie considered some judicial independence necessary and
thought that long terms would obtain that.162
Additionally, these supporters also favored term limits. Bowie, for
example, hated life-tenure. In fact, he thought that “any term of years”
would be better “than the present life-tenure.”163 He suggested that lifetenure “leads to great abuses” because judges “become independent of public
opinion, independent of the people, independent of every wholesome
restraint.”164 This concentrates power “in the hands of a certain class of
lawyers” who practice before the Court of Appeals of Maryland, giving them
“utterly” uncontrollable influence over the court.165 Regular turnover would
keep judges responsive and honest.
Other speakers gave different reasons for supporting term limits. Spencer
thought that “a limited tenure is the main and chief security of an efficient
and wise judiciary.”166 Life-tenure made judges omnipotent because it let
them “forget their individuality and look at themselves as something more
than judges.”167 Elections would let the people keep judges humble.168
Spencer did not believe that regular elections would tempt judges to “pander
to the public appetite” though. If a judge did so, he would “sink himself to
all infamy and oblivion” and never win another election.169
In fact, some writers on the subject suggested that removing life-tenure
would speed up the court system.170 It would “simplify. . . legal process, and
thereby promote the ends of justice.”171 According to Samuel Smucker, all
delay stemmed from “perfectly irresponsible” judges. Smucker believed that
the judges were irresponsible because of their life-tenure.172 In fact, Smucker
believed that all life-tenure was merely part of an “immense mass of
corruption,” that had built up over time and which needed to go.173
159

Id.
Id. at 464-65.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 465-66.
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Id. at 466.
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2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 466.
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Id.
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Id. at 488.
167
Id. at 488 and 490.
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Id. at 490.
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2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 488.
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SMUCKER, supra note 152, at 8.
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Id.
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Id.
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Smucker also thought that requiring judges to campaign would in turn
force them to develop a record to run on.174 He recognized that electioneering
would be embarrassing for judges, but did not care. For example, he thought
an election bill that ran “Vote for Judge Snapdragon! He overruled Binks vs.
Jenks, quashed the writ in Gerrymander’s case, and delivered the great
dissenting opinion in in re Dishwater” would be a probable and favorable
result of allowing judicial elections175 Judges would probably hate having to
campaign, but the judges would want to win reelection. This would require
them to develop a good track record as judge to campaign on.176
Supporters of judicial elections did not fear mob rule.177 In event of
revolution, truly independent judges would not stop the unrest. Even the best
judges would be mere “ropes of sand,” unable to restrain an angry mob.178
Those worried about mob rule thought that appointed judges would be just as
bad. Mr. Gwinn recalled judicial abuses perpetrated by appointed judges
obeying tyrants, like Judge Jeffreys’ “terrible campaign” and “the trial of
Queen Caroline.”179
For many supporters, political parties provided part of the solution.
Although Mr. Hicks distrusted “the influence of party spirit over the people,”
he thought that open partisanship would reduce corruption.180 If the parties
nominated the judges, at least someone took responsibility for the
appointment.181 Under the status-quo system before 1850, “those who
recommend [judges] … are enveloped in a dark cloud, are in obscurity, and
are never known.”182 Others thought that the fickle nature of party politics
174

Id. at 9.
SMUCKER, supra note 152, at 9.
176
Id.
177
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 490.
178
Id.
179
Id. George Jeffreys, 1st Baron Jeffreys of Wem PC (1645-1689), was best known
as the original “hanging judge” for his propensity for mercilessly administering a
cruel brand of justice. William W. Berry III, Eighth Amendment Presumptions a
Constitutional Framework for Curbing Mass Incarceration, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 67,
n. 139 (2015). During the Blood Assizes trials, Jeffreys led the commission
responsible for convicting, sentencing and executing between 150 to 200 prisoners in
less than one month. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Bloody Judge Sir George Jeffreys
(1645 – 1689), 11-SUM Experience 38, 39-40 (2001). Justice Antonin Scalia even
referred to him as “dread Lord Jeffreys.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67
(2004). Queen Caroline’s Case, 129 Eng. Rep. 976, 2 B & B 284 (1820) was the O.J.
Simpson case of its time. King George IV (a philanderer if there ever was one)
attempted to divorce his unwanted wife, Queen Caroline, by accusing her of
adultery. The proceedings in the trial were so infamous they produced the “Rule in
Queen Caroline’s Case,” only repealed by FED. R. EVID. 613(a).
Mr. Gwinn was a prominent lawyer. HARRY, supra note 98, at 35-36.
180
2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 530.
181
Id.
182
Id.
175
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would keep judges in line.183 Hyper-partisan judges knew that their jobs
were at risk whenever the political winds changed.184 This would keep them
honest.185 A third set of delegates believed that no party would actually
nominate a corrupt judge because “[t]hat would be to impugn the purity of
the parties of this country, and to assume that their purpose is an abuse of
power.”186 If partisan judges began ignoring precedent to appease political
whims, “it would be too offensive, too outrageous, to be tolerated in any
community in the State.”187 In fact, it would be counter-productive. People
would not vote for men guilty of such shameless conduct.188
Even supporters of judicial elections disagreed over the issue of “reeligibility.”189 Some loved the idea. Buchannan wanted to be able to
congratulate “faithful servants,” but wanted unfaithful ones to “depart into
outer darkness.”190 Tuck thought that if judges could not be re-elected, good
candidates would never take the bench in the first place.191 Bowie thought
that re-eligibility would allow judges to remain in their positions while
preventing them from cultivating political allies in hopes of securing a job
after leaving the bench.192 Brent thought that re-eligibility would incentivize
good behavior from judges who wanted re-election.193 Merrick thought that
without re-eligibility, taking the bench “would be fiscal suicide for “any
competent lawyer.194 But others disagreed. Howard thought it would
“increase the number of temptations” for bad judges looking for their next
job.195 Chambers thought re-eligibility would encourage pandering to the
majority.196 Supporters of re-eligibility acknowledged this concern but could
live it. Merrick, for example, did not fear pandering.197 He thought that if
Maryland were “so corrupt, so regardless of [its] own best interests, God
help the Republic —God help all chance or hope of security.”198
183

Id. at 488-89.
Id.
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Id.
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2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 488-89.
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Id.
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Id.
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Re-eligibility means the ability of a judge to run for re-election.
190
Id. at 535.
191
Id. at 520.
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2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 523.
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Id.at 525.
194
Id. at 534. Brent pointed out that while a Baltimore Judge earned only $3000, all
told, a good lawyer could earn “$8000, or even $8500 per year.” Id. Only a “nabob
or a Croesus, or perhaps a man ready to go on it for any thing [sic] at all” would take
the job. Id. at 555. While Maryland has experienced some inflation since then, this
author is assured the basic realities remain the same.
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Id. at 530.
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Id. at 525.
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2 DEBATES, supra note 126, at 534.
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Opponents of judicial elections had a radically different narrative centered
on judicial independence and minority rights. Chambers focused heavily on
“the independence of the judiciary…and as necessary to that independence,
the tenure as we know have it … during good behavior.”199 He wanted
judicial independence to protect “the humble, the obscure, and the impotent
… the minority,” not to rubberstamp majority rule.200 But the method of
selection was a sideshow. For opponents of judicial elections, the main issue
was the “judicial tenure.”201
The two sides directly disagreed about Jacksonian political theory.
Chambers thought that Jacksonianism led to an absurd result. The “direct
and legitimate result of such a theory” would “require a dissolution of all
society into an absolute, unqualified, unmixed democracy” fit only for “a
community composed of some few families of men.”202 The theory’s logical
conclusion was that “the people are not to elect a Judge. No, sir, they —that
is, a majority of the people— must act as judge.”203 By allowing the people
to “execute (in mass) the duties and officers created by the government”, the
doctrine would “impeach every act and measure of the government not only
of Maryland, but of every other State in this union; yes sir, of every civilized
government that has ever existed!”204 The people would do what they
wanted, “and neither Constitution nor law could resist or oppose their
sovereign will!”205
Unlike Bowie, Chambers thought that judges ought to be independent of
the people because the people themselves could turn tyrant as well as any
king.206 Judges needed professional freedom to do their duty, freedom they
did not have “when their very existence [as judges] depends upon doing
otherwise.”207 Chambers even darkly reminded the convention that they had
“heard of Lynch law.”208
Judicial elections, according to Chambers, would destroy judicial
independence. An independent judge possessed “a freedom from all motive
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to do wrong; an exemption from all fear to right.”209 Judicial elections gave
judges an incentive to corrupt justice in favor of the powerful and popular.210
Although some judges would be honest, not “every man was a Saint, or a
Hero.”211 Chambers, in short, trusted potential candidates about as far as he
could throw them.
Nor did opponents think that judicial elections would even fix the
problems at hand. Chambers did not believe that judicial elections would
cure partisanship.212 Every candidate “will belong to one political family, or
the other.”213 If the people insisted on someone without political affiliations,
they would be “obliged to select from a class of persons, who are below the
ordinary grade of intellect.”214 Others feared that good judges would not
seek the bench, leaving the elections to party nominees.215 And “by what
magic can the people select one good man out of two bad ones?”216
Some delegates at the convention supported retaining gubernatorial
appointments because they thought that other reforms would solve the
problems. Spencer believed that all partisan appointments happened because
governors controlled “the entire patronage of the State.”217 The Convention
stripped the governors of these appointments, mainly by making judges
elected.218 If judges were the only gubernatorial appointment, no governor
would possess “the temerity … to select a judge because he belongs to one
party or the other.”219
Not all arguments against judicial elections centered on policy. Many
opponents of judicial elections opposed radical reforms on principal.
Chambers advocated caution because he thought a lot was at stake. Judicial
elections were “a step proposed, which can never be retraced.”220 At stake
were “the rights of persons, the rights of property and of reputations. … All
we hold dear.”221 This was about more than party politics.222 It was about
“the poor, the injured, the oppressed, the helpless —the orphan, the desolate
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widow.”223 If the Convention failed now, “the neglect can be repaired by no
human power.”224
Opponents pointed to tradition to justify their anti-change stance.
Chambers appealed to the Founding Fathers.225 He claimed that Jefferson
was the only Founding Father to support judicial elections, and that John
Adams, a most reliable source on Jefferson, had told Chambers that Jefferson
only favored judicial elections “apparently with the feelings of a partisan,
and under the influences which his best friends will most regret.”226 This
alleged sentiment displayed the American roots of judicial independence and
life-tenure.227
Unlike supporters of judicial elections, Chambers actively feared that
elected judges would obey the fickle mob. He invoked the French
Revolution and Robespierre to exemplify the evils of judicial elections.228
Indeed, he believed such a madness was already gripping the nation —
Abolition.229 That “phrenzied [sic] impulse has made havoc of every sense
of duty [abolitionists] owe to their country and its laws.” Chambers warned
that during frenzies like Abolition, elected judges would feel compelled to
vote for abolition.230 This would be —for Chambers, at any rate— a horrible
result. After all, according to Chambers, angry mobs had coerced Pontius
Pilate to sentence Jesus Christ to death in an apparently similar manner.231
Many individual delegates gave idiosyncratic reasons for their positions.
Hicks wanted a permanent and independent judiciary for practical reasons —
elections were disruptive, and nobody in his district cared that much
anyway.232 Others feared that elections would create the appearance of
223
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corruption.233 Judges would know who “abused [the judge’s] character to
lowest point of infamy, and who have praised him as if he were a god.”234 If
a judge ever ruled against the former or for the later, it would look like
corruption.235 Still others thought it would endanger “the independence of
the bar” by giving judges a way to reward their supporters and punish their
opponents.236
The Convention had no shortage of other ideas. Spencer, for example,
wanted gubernatorial appointments like Chambers, but ten-year terms like
Bowie.237 Phelps wanted to pick judges by joint ballot of the legislature, but
that idea received a quick and overwhelming negative vote.238 Donaldson
wanted the Legislature to recommend three men to the governor, who would
then pick.239 Sollers spent the first part of the debate opposing every change,
regardless of merit, on principle; he wanted to leave the judiciary entirly
alone.240
The Convention resolved some issues much more quickly than others.
Terms beat life-tenure early on by substantial margins.241 Mr. Crisfield, the
sponsor of the life-tenure amendment, quickly conceded the point.242 A vote
to strike judicial elections quickly came; judicial elections prevailed
handily.243 The anti-re-eligibility amendment also failed comfortably.244
The final Constitution of 1850 “pleased nobody” in either the public or
the convention.245 It could not get a majority in the Convention, so its
sponsors used procedural gimmicks to insure it did not come up for a yes-no
vote.246 One commentator suggested that the document cost about “$1.50
per word, which, considering the quality of the goods, made it about the
233
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hardest bargain of modern times.”247 Many people opposed it precisely
because of the judicial reforms.248 But it passed, for better or worse, with a
ten thousand vote majority.249
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Maryland debates revealed a deeply divided body politic. The main
reason for switching to term-limited judicial elections was not the Jacksonian
ideology cited by the supporters, although that certainly inspired them. No
evidence supports Hall’s lawyerly plot. In fact, delegates often traded
accusations about how some delegates loved lawyers “a little better than the
people” and were multiplying judicial offices for them —accusations always
vehemently denied.250 Maryland’s leading lawyers —men like Chambers—
in fact opposed judicial elections. No evidence, in short, indicates that
lawyers conspired at all. But it was not an attempt to disempower the
legislature or cut expenses either. The Convention clearly wanted to do both
those things, but electing judges and limiting terms did neither.
Rather, judicial elections and term limits seem to be an assault on the
spoils system. Maryland had a long history of highly partisan judicial
appointments. The new Constitution marked the third “ripper act” in
Maryland’s relatively short history. By electing judges, Maryland hoped to
reduce political corruption by removing the Governor’s patronage.
Supporters of judicial elections and term limits thought their reforms would
depoliticize the judiciary and allow the people to choose good judges.
Opponents feared it would make judges kowtow to the popular will and do
more harm than good. Popular anger at the Legislature over bad fiscal
policies and high taxes surely helped shape public opinion in what amounted
to a no-confidence vote on the probity of politicians, but that did not cause
judicial elections. Political corruption did.
Maryland is still grappling with judicial elections two constitutions, a
major constitutional rewrite, and a hundred and sixty-six years later.251 There
are at least three bills presently pending in the House of Delegates to change
the present system for judicial elections. HB 388 (presently in its first
reading) proposes to allow the governor to appoint judges subject to retention
247
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amendments in the manner used for appellate judges —retention votes at the
next election and every ten years thereafter.252 HB 224 appears to be a
slightly older version of HB 388. The HB 388 version does a better job
editing other related constitutional provisions to remove language
inconsistent with its revisions and cuts the judicial term on the circuit court
from 15 years to 10 years to make it consistent with the appellate courts.253
This is not a new idea. It has been floating around Annapolis since at least
2003.254
As a practical matter, retention elections “virtually guarantee[ ]” that
judges will keep their seats.255 According to one study of states holding
retention elections between 1964 and 2006, out of 6306 retention elections
held, only 56 judges lost their seats.256 Maryland will likely follow the same
pattern. In Maryland’s experience, retention elections for appellate judges
have produced lopsided pro-retention votes. The average retention vote in
Maryland, counting from the start of retention elections until 2006, was
87.3%.257
HB 223 (also in its first reading at time of writing) has a different idea. It
proposes that circuit court judges be appointed by the Governor and
confirmed by the Senate to fifteen year terms in office, but that all circuit
court judges confirmed by less than 80% of the Senate stand in a contested
election (as they do now).258 This would add a step to the selection process
since circuit court judges presently do not need to be confirmed by the
Senate. This method would also allow the minority party to force elections.
252
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Since the Maryland Senate has 47 seats, an 80% threshold means judges
would require 38 votes to avoid the election. That practically means that only
bi-partisan nominees would evade the ballot box.
These bills share a common theme. They aim to reduce the odds of a
judge losing his or her seat. HB 388 and HB 224 do this by switching to a
system where incumbents have historically enjoyed an over 99% retention
rate. HB 223 would allow a judge to retain his or her seat by holding
elections only when the judge receives substantial opposition in the Senate.
Neither bill proposes to outright abandon judicial elections though, despite
all the academic criticism of it. Like the rest of America, Marylanders
apparently like voting for judges.259
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